STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5420665
DOI10.1142/S0219198914500066zbMath1302.91015MaRDI QIDQ5420665
Takehiko Yamato, Yukihiko Funaki
Publication date: 13 June 2014
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player ⋮ A coalition formation value for games in partition function form ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition