STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

DOI10.1142/S0219198914500066zbMath1302.91015MaRDI QIDQ5420665

Takehiko Yamato, Yukihiko Funaki

Publication date: 13 June 2014

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityCournot oligopolycoalition formationcommon pool resourcefarsighted players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player ⋮ A coalition formation value for games in partition function form ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets)

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