Note on the applicability of the VCG mechanism to capacitated assignment problems and extensions

DOI10.1111/j.1467-9574.2007.00356.xzbMath1158.91354OpenAlexW2132459386MaRDI QIDQ5422020

Reinder B. Lok, Dries Vermeulen, Dolores Romero Morales

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Statistica Neerlandica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9574.2007.00356.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• The package assignment model.
• Incentives in Teams
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions