Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry

DOI10.1007/978-4-431-72761-3_6zbMath1330.91020OpenAlexW125084062MaRDI QIDQ5424507

Shlomo Weber, Anna Rubinchik

Publication date: 5 November 2007

Published in: Advances in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-72761-3_6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Cites Work

• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• On global univalence theorems
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

This page was built for publication: Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry