Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

DOI10.1093/bjps/axm012zbMath1221.00026OpenAlexW2157600336MaRDI QIDQ5426542

Branden Fitelson, Andrew Waterman

Publication date: 12 November 2007

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm012

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

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