Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00450.xzbMath1206.91006MaRDI QIDQ5427684

Debraj Ray, Kyle Hyndman

Publication date: 21 November 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Transparency, complementarity and holdout ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures ⋮ Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations ⋮ Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities ⋮ Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown ⋮ Cooperative Game with Agreements Implemented by a Third Party ⋮ Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation

This page was built for publication: Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements