Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00446.XzbMath1206.91058OpenAlexW3125370062MaRDI QIDQ5427686

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Publication date: 21 November 2007

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00446.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Signaling drive over the long term ⋮ Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games ⋮ Imperfect memory and choice under risk ⋮ Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns ⋮ Committee, expert advice, and the weighted majority algorithm: an application to the pricing decision of a monopolist

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