Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003

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Publication:5428123

DOI10.1007/b11817zbMath1122.94377OpenAlexW2480001466WikidataQ56235047 ScholiaQ56235047MaRDI QIDQ5428123

N. A. Howgrave-Graham, William Whyte, David Pointcheval, Ari Singer, Phong Q. Nguyen, Joseph H. Silverman, John Proos

Publication date: 28 November 2007

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/b11817




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