Incentive-Based Pricing for Network Games with Complete and Incomplete Information

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_22zbMath1153.91370OpenAlexW280298644MaRDI QIDQ5428669

Tamer Başar, Hongxia Shen

Publication date: 23 November 2007

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_22

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationincomplete informationnonlinear pricingreverse Stackelberg gameproblemincentive policyteam solutionincentive controllabilityincentivedesignusage-dependent pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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