Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
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Publication:5429097
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00427.xzbMath1297.91076OpenAlexW2133405904MaRDI QIDQ5429097
Publication date: 29 November 2007
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00427.x
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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