Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2003

DOI10.1007/b11836zbMath1124.68330OpenAlexW2495578842MaRDI QIDQ5431343

Burkhard Monien, Imrich Vrt'o, Marios Mavronicolas, Thomas Lücking, Manuel Rode, Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 7 December 2007

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/b11836

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)

Related Items (14)

The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game ⋮ The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost ⋮ Utilitarian resource assignment ⋮ Minimizing expectation plus variance ⋮ Cost sharing mechanisms for fair pricing of resource usage ⋮ A new model for selfish routing ⋮ Selfish routing with incomplete information ⋮ Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions ⋮ Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria ⋮ Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture ⋮ Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture ⋮ Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria ⋮ Machine load balancing game with linear externalities ⋮ Selfish unsplittable flows

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