Why conclusions should remain single

DOI10.1007/s10992-010-9153-3zbMath1233.03016OpenAlexW1993148732MaRDI QIDQ543530

Florian Steinberger

Publication date: 17 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9153-3

zbMATH Keywords

inferentialismmultiple conclusionsproof-theoretic arguments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (19)

‘Transitivity’ of Consequence Relations ⋮ HOW A SEMANTICS FOR TONK SHOULD BE ⋮ Meta-inferences and supervaluationism ⋮ From many-valued consequence to many-valued connectives ⋮ Axiomatizing non-deterministic many-valued generalized consequence relations ⋮ Proof-theoretic pluralism ⋮ Logical multilateralism ⋮ The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics ⋮ Introduction: Bilateralism and Proof-Theoretic Semantics (Part I) ⋮ Introduction: Bilateralism and Proof-Theoretic Semantics (Part II) ⋮ Bilateral Rules as Complex Rules ⋮ Compositionality solves Carnap's problem ⋮ Logical consequence and the paradoxes ⋮ Harmony in multiple-conclusion natural-deduction ⋮ Explicating logical independence ⋮ Hopeful monsters: a note on multiple conclusions ⋮ Classical harmony and separability ⋮ Single-assumption systems in proof-theoretic semantics ⋮ Structuring co-constructive logic for proofs and refutations

Cites Work

• Harmony and autonomy in classical logic
• What is Logic?
• Natural deduction and sequent calculus for intuitionistic relevant logic
• Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic
• Rejection
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