The welfare cost of one-size-fits-all patent protection

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2010.11.003zbMath1231.91355OpenAlexW2074073118MaRDI QIDQ543803

Angus C. Chu

Publication date: 17 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23286/1/MPRA_paper_23286.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

economic growthR\&Dtime-consistent patent policyuniform patent protection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Multisectoral models in economics (91B66) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model
• On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games
• Time-consistent policies
• Patent policy in an endogenous growth model
• Patents in a model of endogenous growth
• Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous economic growth
• Effects of blocking patents on R\&D: a quantitative DGE analysis
• The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models
• A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction

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