Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
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Publication:5441271
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00782.xzbMath1133.91050OpenAlexW3123366582MaRDI QIDQ5441271
Publication date: 11 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00782.x
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