Strategic equilibrium versus global optimum for a pair of competing servers

DOI10.1239/jap/1165505215zbMath1169.90333OpenAlexW2095174036MaRDI QIDQ5441530

Boaz Golany, Benjamin Avi-Itzhak, Uriel G. Rothblum

Publication date: 15 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1165505215

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumqueueing systemlinear reward scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) 2-person games (91A05) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20)

Related Items (3)

A generalized two-agent location problem: Asymmetric dynamics and coordination ⋮ The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency ⋮ Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Strategic Equilibrium for a Pair of Competing Servers with Convex Cost and Balking
• Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes
• Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game

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