Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2007.00765.XzbMath1142.91467OpenAlexW2022720694MaRDI QIDQ5441623

David G. Pearce, Dilip Abreu

Publication date: 15 February 2008

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~dabreu/index_files/12-06-2006MASTER.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

A reputation for honesty ⋮ Bargaining with evolving private information ⋮ Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Games without rules ⋮ No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining ⋮ Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests ⋮ Limited foresight equilibrium ⋮ Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types

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