Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
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Publication:5441826
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00795.xzbMath1133.91003OpenAlexW2171975316MaRDI QIDQ5441826
Publication date: 15 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/sannikov_games.pdf
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