EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

DOI10.1111/J.1467-999X.2007.00269.XzbMath1142.91478OpenAlexW2075280384MaRDI QIDQ5441933

Güth, Werner, Kerstin Pull, Sven Fischer, Eberhard Karls

Publication date: 15 February 2008

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999x.2007.00269.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
• The Bargaining Problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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