Solving Systems of Modular Equations in One Variable: How Many RSA-Encrypted Messages Does Eve Need to Know?

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-78440-1_3zbMath1162.94391OpenAlexW1491644923MaRDI QIDQ5445445

Maike Ritzenhofen, Alexander May

Publication date: 5 March 2008

Published in: Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78440-1_3

zbMATH Keywords

Coppersmith's methodChinese RemainderingHåstad's attacksystems of univariate modular polynomials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (2)

Using LLL-Reduction for Solving RSA and Factorization Problems ⋮ Forty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem: A brief survey

Cites Work

• Breaking RSA may be as difficult as factoring
• Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients
• Small solutions to polynomial equations, and low exponent RSA vulnerabilities
• Low-Exponent RSA with Related Messages
• A “WEAK” PRIVACY PROTOCOL USING THE RSA CRYPTO ALGORITHM
• Solving Simultaneous Modular Equations of Low Degree
• A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
• Breaking RSA may not be equivalent to factoring
• Floating-Point LLL Revisited
• On the Equivalence of RSA and Factoring Regarding Generic Ring Algorithms
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