Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.004zbMath1230.91015OpenAlexW2171692416MaRDI QIDQ545162

Mehmet Karakaya

Publication date: 22 June 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21939

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games ⋮ Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games ⋮ Rationing rules and stable coalition structures ⋮ Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities ⋮ Local fairness in hedonic games via individual threshold coalitions ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
• Coalition formation and stability
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
• NP-completeness in hedonic games
• On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion