Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion
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Publication:545162
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.004zbMath1230.91015OpenAlexW2171692416MaRDI QIDQ545162
Publication date: 22 June 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21939
Related Items (8)
Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games ⋮ Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games ⋮ Rationing rules and stable coalition structures ⋮ Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities ⋮ Local fairness in hedonic games via individual threshold coalitions ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
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