Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action

DOI10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4zbMath1214.91011OpenAlexW2127446434MaRDI QIDQ545659

Hannelore De Silva, Karl Sigmund, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen

Publication date: 22 June 2011

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorysocial dilemmapublic goods gamescostly punishmentvoluntary interactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games ⋮ Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging ⋮ Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Predicting peak of participants in collective action ⋮ Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies ⋮ Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators

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