Security of NMAC and HMAC Based on Non-malleability

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_9zbMath1153.94376OpenAlexW1544536711MaRDI QIDQ5458937

Marc Fischlin

Publication date: 24 April 2008

Published in: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (4)

Witness authenticating NIZKs and applications ⋮ Basing PRFs on Constant-Query Weak PRFs: Minimizing Assumptions for Efficient Symmetric Cryptography ⋮ Expedient Non-malleability Notions for Hash Functions ⋮ Delayed-Key Message Authentication for Streams

Cites Work

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• Keying Hash Functions for Message Authentication
• On the Security of HMAC and NMAC Based on HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 (Extended Abstract)
• Foundations of Non-malleable Hash and One-Way Functions
• How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions
• Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1
• Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
• New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security Without Collision-Resistance

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