A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17zbMath1136.91401OpenAlexW1804511434MaRDI QIDQ5459983

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Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms ⋮ Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Advertisement allocation for generalized second-pricing schemes ⋮ Balanced allocation mechanism: an optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope ⋮ A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling ⋮ Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders ⋮ A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

Cites Work

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• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• Market equilibrium via a primal--dual algorithm for a convex program
• AdWords and generalized online matching
• On the complexity of equilibria
• A Level Algorithm for Preemptive Scheduling
• Preemptive Scheduling of Uniform Processor Systems
• Optimization and Approximation in Deterministic Sequencing and Scheduling: a Survey
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy

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