Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29zbMath1136.91496OpenAlexW2130561560MaRDI QIDQ5459997

Mukund Sundararajan, Aranyak Mehta, Shahar Dobzinski, Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget ⋮ Beyond Moulin mechanisms ⋮ Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? ⋮ The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games ⋮ A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation ⋮ Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design ⋮ On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good ⋮ Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

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• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Cost Sharing Methods for Makespan and Completion Time Scheduling
• Incentives in Teams
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

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