Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_30zbMath1136.91311OpenAlexW4250987137MaRDI QIDQ5459998

Niv Buchbinder, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Joseph (Seffi) Naor, Ariel Orda

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_30

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games ⋮ How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium ⋮ A distributed algorithm for a set cover game

Cites Work

• Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• A general approach to online network optimization problems
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• The Online Set Cover Problem
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Algorithms – ESA 2005

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