Executive pay and shareholder litigation*

DOI10.1093/rof/rfl003zbMath1151.91043OpenAlexW2024711075MaRDI QIDQ5460396

Lin Peng, Ailsa Röell

Publication date: 5 May 2008

Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfl003

zbMATH Keywords

LitigationCompensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Inconspicuousness and obfuscation: how large shareholders dynamically manipulate output and information for trading purposes ⋮ Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation

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