Efficiency wages in an experimental labor market

DOI10.1073/pnas.152449999zbMath1063.91056OpenAlexW2066904879WikidataQ34192854 ScholiaQ34192854MaRDI QIDQ5460764

Marl L. Rigdon

Publication date: 19 July 2005

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.152449999

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

An experimental analysis of cooperation and productivity in the trust game

Cites Work

• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

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