A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000783zbMath1138.91342MaRDI QIDQ5470115

Ulrich Berger

Publication date: 29 May 2006

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fictitious playbest response dynamicsbest reply dynamicsrole games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Fictitious play in networks, Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

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