RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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Publication:5470116
DOI10.1142/S0219198906000795zbMath1128.91010MaRDI QIDQ5470116
Publication date: 29 May 2006
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment ⋮ Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
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