Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00398zbMath1136.91326OpenAlexW2062097404MaRDI QIDQ5472960

Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00398

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY ⋮ Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games

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