Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00426zbMath1153.91444OpenAlexW1986431992MaRDI QIDQ5472969

Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00426

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

A theory of perceived discrimination ⋮ Optimal stalling when bargaining ⋮ Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases ⋮ Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games ⋮ Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games ⋮ Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium

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