Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5472978
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00440zbMath1154.91384OpenAlexW2083102868MaRDI QIDQ5472978
Publication date: 19 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00440
Related Items (19)
Voting in the limelight ⋮ Public information and electoral bias ⋮ A signaling model of repeated elections ⋮ A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs ⋮ Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse ⋮ Herding with collective preferences ⋮ Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework ⋮ Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections ⋮ Would rational voters acquire costly information? ⋮ The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences ⋮ Voting with preferences over margins of victory ⋮ Pivots versus signals in elections ⋮ Majority rule when voters like to win ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
This page was built for publication: Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
