Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
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Publication:5473020
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00499.xzbMath1130.91324OpenAlexW2150442227MaRDI QIDQ5473020
Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar
Publication date: 19 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00499.x
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