The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00268zbMath1103.91324OpenAlexW2167543403WikidataQ56028805 ScholiaQ56028805MaRDI QIDQ5474960

Michael D. Whinston, I. R. Segal'

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00268

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Utility theory for games (91A30)

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