The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
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Publication:5475004
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345zbMath1142.91613OpenAlexW3124642799MaRDI QIDQ5475004
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp575.pdf
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