The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00355zbMath1141.91408OpenAlexW1995282411MaRDI QIDQ5475010

Steven R. Williams, Mark Allen Satterthwaite

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1256.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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