Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00357zbMath1141.94375OpenAlexW2093600062MaRDI QIDQ5475012

Amparo Urbano, José E. Vila

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00357

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (21)

Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals ⋮ A simple model of secure public communication ⋮ Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ⋮ Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. ⋮ Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types ⋮ Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information ⋮ A commitment folk theorem ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol ⋮ The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information ⋮ Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. ⋮ Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

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