Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
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Publication:5475015
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00360zbMath1141.91311OpenAlexW1995714903MaRDI QIDQ5475015
Mark Stegeman, Martin Dufwenberg
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00360
Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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