Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00292zbMath1184.91130OpenAlexW2005146051MaRDI QIDQ5477776

Roger Guesnerie

Publication date: 29 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00292

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgerational expectations equilibriaeductive learningevolutive learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Economic dynamics (91B55)

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