Crowding out and crowding in: when does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.017zbMath1246.91058OpenAlexW2033063561MaRDI QIDQ548246

Tobias Broer

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.017

zbMATH Keywords

defaultredistributioninsurancefiscal policylimited enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Related Items (4)

Public versus private provision of liquidity: is there a trade-off? ⋮ Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited? ⋮ Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics ⋮ The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: an experimental study

Cites Work

• Public versus private risk sharing
• Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets
• Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default

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