Information-constrained optima with retrading: an externality and its market-based solution

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.11.001zbMath1246.91071OpenAlexW2171750123WikidataQ41819707 ScholiaQ41819707MaRDI QIDQ548251

Robert M. Townsend, Weerachart T. Kilenthong

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/108265

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddecentralizationprivate informationexternalitiesconstrained efficiencyWalrasian equilibriumretrading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (5)

Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts ⋮ Rights to retrade, free-riding and insurance requirement ⋮ Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter? ⋮ Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics ⋮ Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking

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• Inefficient Credit Booms
• An Equilibrium Existence Theorem without Convexity Assumptions
• VALUATION EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO OPTIMUM
• Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies

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