Information in Continuous Time Decision Models with Many Agents

DOI10.1017/S0269964800004551zbMath1094.91504OpenAlexW2037437045MaRDI QIDQ5485387

Marco Scarsini, Monica Brezzi, Bruno Bassan

Publication date: 30 August 2006

Published in: Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0269964800004551

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

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• Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations
• Compatible Measures and Merging

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