Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2zbMath1255.91012MaRDI QIDQ5486922

John Duggan, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 18 September 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters ⋮ A theory of voting in large elections ⋮ Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates ⋮ Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists ⋮ Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model ⋮ ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING ⋮ The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models ⋮ Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics ⋮ Vote-motivated candidates ⋮ Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty ⋮ Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties ⋮ Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey ⋮ Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates ⋮ Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models ⋮ The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates ⋮ Ideological extremism and primaries ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives ⋮ Unidimensional Downsian politics: median, utilitarian or what else?

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