Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
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Publication:5486924
DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4zbMath1255.91082OpenAlexW2151450335MaRDI QIDQ5486924
Thomas R. Palfrey, Enriqueta Aragonès
Publication date: 18 September 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-x_4
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