How to obtain full privacy in auctions

DOI10.1007/s10207-006-0001-yzbMath1312.94035OpenAlexW1984808769MaRDI QIDQ5492128

Felix Brandt

Publication date: 13 October 2006

Published in: International Journal of Information Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-006-0001-y

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscryptographic protocolshomomorphic encryption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Anonymous sealed bid auction protocol based on a variant of the dining cryptographers' protocol ⋮ Trustworthy sealed-bid auction with low communication cost atop blockchain ⋮ Secure sealed-bid online auctions using discreet cryptographic proofs ⋮ Efficient VSS free of computational assumption

Cites Work

• Efficient signature generation by smart cards
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• Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust
• Bounded-concurrent secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority
• A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
• How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems
• A Statistically-Hiding Integer Commitment Scheme Based on Groups with Hidden Order
• Financial Cryptography
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