Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

DOI10.1137/120878422zbMath1307.91088arXiv1106.0961OpenAlexW2179880041MaRDI QIDQ5494943

Saeed Alaei

Publication date: 30 July 2014

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.0961

zbMATH Keywords

approximationreductioncombinatorial auctionsprophet inequalitiesBayesian mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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