Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling

DOI10.1145/2488608.2488616zbMath1293.90030arXiv1305.0597OpenAlexW2037912458MaRDI QIDQ5495775

Balasubramanian Sivan, David Malec, Jason D. Hartline, Shuchi Chawla

Publication date: 7 August 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.0597

zbMATH Keywords

schedulingmakespanmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36)

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