Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
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Publication:5495790
DOI10.1145/2488608.2488634zbMath1293.91081arXiv1209.4703OpenAlexW1976086105MaRDI QIDQ5495790
Brendan Lucier, Hu Fu, Michal Feldman, N. V. Gravin
Publication date: 7 August 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.4703
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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