Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes

DOI10.1145/1011767.1011781zbMath1322.91012OpenAlexW2040940409MaRDI QIDQ5501487

David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman

Publication date: 3 August 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4054443

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilitycomputational mechanism designfailure modelsdistributed algorithmic mechanism designalgorithm compatibilitycommunication compatibilityrational failurerational manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Distributed systems (68M14) Network protocols (68M12) Distributed algorithms (68W15)

Related Items (6)

Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines ⋮ An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks ⋮ A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing ⋮ Secure message transmission on directed networks ⋮ Incentive-compatible interdomain routing ⋮ Rationality in the Full-Information Model

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