Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: comment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.006zbMath1217.91072OpenAlexW2078993496MaRDI QIDQ550190

Maciej H. Kotowski

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

worst-case analysisfirst-price auctions\(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
• Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty

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