On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
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Publication:550192
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.002zbMath1217.91017OpenAlexW3123610452MaRDI QIDQ550192
Publication date: 8 July 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.525.6406
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (6)
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ Tempered best response dynamics ⋮ Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies ⋮ Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
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